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NOTES
UNITED STATES v. WADE:
A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of
United States v. Wade,1 attempted to cure the evils inherent in
the use of eyewitness identification evidence in criminal matters
a problem that has long been perplexing to the criminal bar.
Billy Joe Wade was arrested as a bank robbery suspect, and
after an indictment was returned and counsel appointed to represent him, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a lineup
of the defendant "with five or six" other prisoners before two
witnesses to the bank robbery. The defendant was required to
wear strips of tape such as allegedly used by the robbers and
was required to utter words that the felons used during the perpetration of the crime.
At the trial, the two witnesses made an identification of the
defendant, and the prior lineup identification was then elicited
from both witnesses upon cross examination. Defense counsel
then moved to strike the witnesses' courtroom identification on
the ground that conduct of the lineup without notice to and in
absence of appointed counsel violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to the assistance of counsel and his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The motion
was denied and Wade was convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction and ordered a new trial at which the in-court identification evidence was to be excluded, holding that, though the
lineup did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, "the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel, already chosen to represent appellant, was a
' '2
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
3
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, described the pre-trial
identification stage as critical in a criminal prosecution, and held
that the accused, absent an intelligent waiver, is entitled to representation by counsel at pre-trial confrontations with his accusers for purposes of identification.4
U.S. 218 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
2358 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1966).
3385 U.S. 811 (1966).
4The Supreme Court also agreed with the conclusion of the court of
appeals that the lineup itself, with the requirement of the defendant to
repeat words used by the robber, did not violate the privilege against selfincrimination. The Court stated:
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves
1388
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The Court concluded, however, that absence of counsel does
not per se require exclusion of the eyewitness identification evidence since the threatened deprivation of the defendant's rights
can be rectified by requiring the state to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the in-court identification had an origin
independent of the objectionable lineup.
We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade's motion

to strike the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at
trial because of the absence of his counsel at the lineup required,
as the Court of Appeals held, the grant of a new trial at which such

evidence is to be excluded. We do not think this disposition can
be justified without first giving the Government the opportunity to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than
the lineup identification.5

A full understanding of the impact of this decision requires
an understanding of the nature and essential weakness of eye-

witness identification evidence.
The gravity of the problem is recognized by numerous authoritative writers and case decisions dealing with the subject of
no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no
different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt

to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of
the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak within hearing
distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the
robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a 'testimonial' nature;
he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic,
not to speak his guilt. Wade at 222.
With this refusal to further extend the self-incrimination logic, Wade
interrupts the continuing expansion of the fifth amendment privilege developed in the Escobedo-Mirandaline of decisions. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Wade, however,
adopts and carries forward the Supreme Court's recognition in these cases of
an individual's right to counsel when faced with a critical head-on contest
against the state. Miranda held that the right to counsel at the custodial
interrogation stage in a criminal prosecution was such a critical circumstance. Wade further advances this protection by requiring right to counsel
at all critical stages of the prosecution, which, the court concludes in Wade,
includes all pre-trial confrontations with witnesses. The majority stated:
[Tioday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of
the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings where the results
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guaranty to apply
to 'critical' stages of the proceedings. Wade at 224.
5Wade at 239. This case was the first of a triad handed down in the
October .966 term dealing with the problem of eyewitness identification as
evidence. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), set the bounds of the Wade
ruling - the retroactivity of the lineup decisions. The Court stated. "We
hold that Wade and Gilbert affect only those cases and all future cases which
involve confrontations for identification purposes conducted in the absence
of counsel afterthis date, [June 12, 1966]." Id. at 296.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), held that the admission of
the in-court identifications without first determining that they were not
tainted by an illegal lineup but had an independent source was reversible
error. Like the remand in the Wade decision, further proceedings were
necessary to determine if the in-court identification had an independent
source or that its introduction into evidence was harmless error.
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identification evidence. The Supreme Court in the present case
noted that: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are wellknown; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." 6
The late Judge Jerome Frank stated that "[p] erhaps errone-

ous identification of the accused constitutes the major cause of
the known wrongful convictions." '7 Professor Edmund Cahn
has pointed out that "an honest mistake of identification ...

can

hang an innocent man despite the most meticulous and fair
minded trial of his case." 8
The frequent occurrence of such honest mistakes, causing
innocent men to be sent to jail, led Justice Frankfurter to state:

"What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy."'
6 Wade at 228. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, in explaining the value of confessions, noted
that without confessions it would be difficult for the state to obtain a conviction in most cases because the other evidence available, "the victim's identification, is evidence which is frequently unreliable." Id at 519.
7J. FRANK AND B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1957).

8 E. CAHN,'THE MoRAL DECISION 259 (1955).
9 F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VENZETTI 30 (1927). Even
prosecutors have recognized the inherent weakness of eyewitness identification. See, e.g., Kuh, Careers in Prosecution Officers, 14 JUR. LEG. ED.
("Proof that relies wholly on the identification made
175, 187 n. 21 (1961).
by eyewitnesses is inherently weak: persons who merely saw a thief or attacker briefly or under conditions of stress, may, despite the best intentions,
too readily be mistaken.")
Mistakes in the eyewitness identification process have led a Commission of the English Government to state:
[Elvidence as to identity based on personal impressions, however bona
fide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence, the least to be relied upon, and
therefore, unless supported by other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury.
E. WATSON, THE TRIAL OF ADOLPH BECK 250 (1924).
The contention that eyewitness identification should be supported by
other facts has one of its strongest advocates in Patrick M. Wall. In his
work dealing with the eyewitness identification problem he states:
To sum up, then, the proposed qualitative rule of corroboration, whether
enacted by the legislatures or adopted by the courts, would constitute
a compromise between the present situation in America, where it is
often too easy to convict an innocent man, and some even more strict
rule, which might unnecessarily hamper the conviction of the guilty.
WALL, EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 192 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wall.]
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also recognized the vagaries of
eyewitness identification. In re Bryant, 176 Pa. 309, 35 A. 571 (1896), the
court stated:
There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of
justice has to deal. The carelessness or superficiality of observers, the
rarity of powers of graphic description, and the different force with
which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons, make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts
testified to even by actual witnesses who have seen the parties in
question.

...

Id. at 318, 35A. at 577.
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The fact that the eyewitness, in stating his opinion, uses
positive or absolute terms, does not make his identification relia-

ble. Borchard, in discussing this subject stated that "[t]he positiveness of witnesses is sometimes . . . in inverse ratio to their
reliability."1° Wall explains this conclusion when he states:
Behind this view lie two explanations, one psychological and the
other practical. Psychologically, the individual who is careless in
his observations and weak in memory may often be the type of
person who makes snap judgments and in whom such qualities as
'pride and stubborness, make for confirmation of the original identification rather than for open-minded reconsideration.' And as a
practical matter, even if a witness is uncertain or hesitant, he may
be subjected to so many suggestive influences by the police that
at the trial he will make 'a positive identification which no amount
of subsequent cross-examination will be able to shake.11

Thus, even a finding that an eyewitness is both credible and
positive is not an alleviation of the shortcomings of such evidence.
The eyewitness may be both honest, as Frankfurter has pointed
out, and positive, as Borchard has pointed out, and yet still be
1
mistaken. 2

The principal causes for the inherent weakness of eyewitness identification evidence are: (a) The normal fallabilities of
human sense perception and memory, and (b) the susceptibility
of the human mind to suggestive influences. 13 Wigmore, in discussing the first of these causes, observed that it should be considered
that most persons . . . have features not sharply distinctive of
a few individuals (e.g. simply, a large nose, blue eyes), and that
most observers receive only the simplest impressions of features,
expressible in only the loosest language (e.g. large nose, dark hair),
it is easy to appreciate how often the items . . .,as recorded, may
be items common1 4to many individuals, and yet may cause recognition of sameness.

Cases of mistaken identity are surprisingly frequent. As
noted above, one reason for this apparent anomaly is the fact
that the normal person sees but a few of someone else's distinguishing characteristics, retains even fewer in his mind, and is
10

E.

BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 50 (1932).

11 Wall at 15.

12 For examples of many cases where credible and positive eyewitnesses
have been mistaken, see C. A. MITCHELL, SCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL 37-47
(1911).
13 The Wade Court also enunciated this bipartite causation of the problem:
We do not assume that these risks are the result of police procedures
intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. Rather we assume they
derive from [a] the dangers inherent in eye witness identification and
[b] the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification.
Wade at 235.
14J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §251, at 537 (3d ed.
1937).
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able to revive fewer still when asked to describe the person observed or to identify one thought to be the same.15
The second major cause of the eyewitness identification
problem is the "one factor which, more than anything else, devastates memory and plays havoc with our best intended recollections: that is, the power of suggestion." 16
The Wade Court has taken judicial cognizance of the police
practices of suggesting, indirectly for the most part, although at
times blatantly, to the identifier, the person considered to be the
accused.
But the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable
factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair
trial. .

.

. A major factor contributing to the high incidence of

miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the
degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.'
The Supreme Court, in the Wade case, has not only recognized that suggestive identification practices exist, but has delineated the means employed:
Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior identifications admitted as evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances of
suggestive procedures, for example, that all in the lineup but the
suspect were known to the identifying witness, that the other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance from
the suspect, that only the suspect was required to wear distinctive
clothing which the culprit allegedly wore, that the witness is told

by the police that they have caught the culprit after which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail, that
the suspect is pointed out before or during a lineup, and that the
participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing
which fits only the suspect.' 8
15 Id. at 536. This conclusion is supported by many psychologists as well
as legal scholars, one of whom, has stated that "there is such likeness, as well
as such difference, between many individuals, that persons who have not a
clear and quick perception of form and expression may very easily mistake
one man or woman for another.

. . "

HARRIS, BEFORE AND AT TRIAL 373

(Kerr ed. 1890), as reported in Wall at 9, n. 15.

16 H. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 69 (1908).

17 Wade at 228.

ISId.at 232. In a prosecution for armed robbery and rape, a husband
and wife identified the subsequently convicted defendant. The conviction
was upheld by the state's highest court notwithstanding that the lineup consisted of the defendant and four members of the states attorney's force
known to the complainant husband in his capacity as an investigator for the
states attorney's office. Thus, the evil of knowing all the members of a
lineup except the suspect not only existed, but has been permitted. People
v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963). In affirming the conviction,
the court stated:
'There is no requirement in the law that an .accused person must
be placed among a group of persons for the purpose of testing the
ability of a witness to identify him as the guilty person .... and the
manner' does not render the identification testimony incompetent, but
only goes to the weight of the evidence.
Id. at 509, 192 N.E.2d at 922.
See also People v. James, 218 Cal. App. 2d 166, 32 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1963).
The dissimilarity might be in the clothing, in other words dissimilar to
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This original identification, the reliability of which determines the worth of the courtroom identification, usually takes
place in a police station, far removed from the courtroom, and
from those rules of evidence and procedure which seek to insulate
the witness from suggestive influences. It is this pre-trial corporeal identification of the defendant which is in issue for "[n] o
part of the field of proof has been so defective in its use of the
common sense of psychology. And at no point is the danger
greater of condemning an innocent person."' 9
Prior to the Wade decision, it was generally the practice of
the courts, when made aware of suggestive police practices or
probable human error in the pre-trial identification of an accused, to permit such evidence to be considered by the jury rather
than to exclude the subsequent in-court identification. This approach was based upon the supposition that any pre-trial impropriety was not a matter of admission or exclusion, but a matthe clothing worn by the accused. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394
P.2d 106 (1964). In a number of cases, witnesses have admitted that they
were unable to identify the defendant until after they had seen him dressed.
"It is not unreasonable to conclude that these witnesses identified the clothing the defendant wore rather than the defendant himself, and this may be
so even in the absence of an original reluctance to identify." Wall at 55.
The dissimilarity, causing the suggestion, can be that of characteristic
nationality. In a Canadian case, e.g., the defendant had been picked out of a
lineup of six men, of whom he was the only Oriental. Regina v. Armstrong,
29 W.W.R. (n.s.) 141 (B.C. 1959). See also People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62,
116 N.E. 793 (1917), where the defendant was the only Italian in the lineup.
Variance of the physical features of the lineup participants have been
proven to cause the suggestion, both intentionally and subliminally; e. g.,
height variance, State v. Duggan, 215 Or. 151, 333 P.2d 907 (1958), wherein
the witness testified in open court that he identified the subsequently convicted defendant only because he was the only tall man in the lineup.
The Court in affirming this assault and battery conviction, stated: "In view
of the foregoing testimony, we fail to see how the jury could have been
misled as to the basis on which the defendant was picked out of the lineup.
The ... assignment of error is without merit." Id. at 162, 333 P.2d at 912.
For other cases on physical dissimilarities, see Fredrickson v. United
States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 262, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v.
Adell, 75 Ill. App. 2d 385, 221 N.E.2d 72 (1966).
Many cases affirm the
police practice of informing the witness that they have apprehended the culprit after which the witness identifies such person, viewed alone. See Aaron
v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So.2d 309 (1961) ; Bishop v. State, 236 Ark. 12,
364 S.W.2d 676 (1963); People v. Thompson, 406 Ill. 555, 94 N.E.2d 349
(1950) ; People v. Berne, 384 Ill. 334, 51 N.E.2d 578 (1943) ; People v. Martin, 304 Ill. 494, 136 N.E. 711 (1922) ; Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366, 229
S.W.2d 516 (1950).
Authorities label this impropriety the "show-up," as
distinguished from a "lineup" where at least two and as many as seven or

more people are brought before the witness for purposes of identification.

This practice has led Wall to comment: "Together with its aggravated
forms, it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now
or ever used by the police. The nature and cause of the suggestion are
readily discernible." Wall at 31. Wigmore's criticism of the "show-up" is
equally as harsh when he states that "there is no excuse for jeopardizing the
fate of innocent men by such clumsy, antiquated methods; a recognition under such circumstances is next to worthless." WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1130, n.
2 (3d ed. 1940).
19 Wigmore, Corroboration by Witness' Identification of an Accused on
Arrest, 25 ILL. L. REV. 550, 551 (1931)..
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ter of weight to be accorded to such evidence of identification. 0
It was generally concluded that "[t]he jury is more likely to make
an intelligent and correct decision on the accuracy of the trial
identification if all the circumstances surrounding the original
21
identification are brought out into the light." '
This approach has proved troublesome, however, in that a
person being identified, prior to Wade's requirement of the presence of counsel, would ordinarily be unable to determine if improprieties existed. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in
Wade, supports this conclusion when he states:
[N]either witnesses nor lineup participants are apt to be alert for
conditions prejudicial to the suspect. And if they were, it would
likely be of scant benefit to the suspect since neither witnesses nor
lineup participants are likely to be schooled in the detection of
suggestive influences. 22

The Supreme Court, after recognizing and discussing at
great length the gravity of this problem, held that the accused, in
light of the extension of constitutional protections to all "critical"
stages in a criminal prosecution, is entitled to counsel at all pretrial confrontations with a witness. The Court further held that
deprivation of that right, absent an intelligent waiver, would prohibit a subsequent courtroom identification by the witness unless
the prosecution could establish by clear and convincing evidence
that such in-court identification had an origin independent of the
2
unattended pre-trial proceeding. 3
The mere presence of counsel, the Court clearly implies,
leads to the desired end, that the innocent be found innocent and
the guilty be found guilty. "The presence of counsel at such
critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure
that the accused's interests will be protected consistently with
our adversary theory of criminal prosecution. ' 2

4

The opinion

asserts that with counsel present at the lineup, the prejudice attached to any impropriety can be overcome in the minds of the
jury by effective cross examination. "[C]ounsel's presence at
the lineup would equip him to attack not only the lineup identification, but the courtroom identification as well.... -25
The Court's first safeguard, presence of counsel, raises questions both as to its rationale and as to practical application of
20 See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 406 Ill. 555, 94 N.E.2d 349 (1950) ; People v. Branch, 127 Cal. App. 2d 438, 274 P.2d 31 (1954); Commonwealth v.
Downer, 159 Pa. Super. 626, 49 A.2d 516 (1946). See generally G. ABRAMS,
ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE 26 (1958). For a complete and detailed survey
of this pre-Wade problem see Annot. 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960).
21 Wall at 136.

22 Wade at 230.

22 Such is not a new concept. It has been known by many names, for
example, the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" as labeled in Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1962). The Wade Court extended the
Wong Sun case in adopting the independent origin rule.
24 Wade at 227.
25

Id. at 241.
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the protection. The Court does not take into consideration the
possibility that suggestion may occur prior to the lineup. For
example, policemen have occasionally used surreptitious methods
to implant the suggestion. One such technique is to point out
the accused to the witness before the lineup takes place, informing such witness of the individual's status as a suspect.2 In fact,
police practices have on occasion involved the use of peep-holes
and two-way mirrors.

27

Further, the Wade Court does not dictate a rule of police
practice requiring the identification parade to desist if an attorney makes timely protestations of improprieties. And since the
Court held that a defendant must, at the request of the police,
wear particular clothing and utter the words used by the actual
perpetrator of the crime while not violating any fifth amendment self-incrimination right, the lawyer seems to be relegated
to the position of a mere passive observer. Justice Black, in his
partly dissenting, partly concurring opinion, seems to be raising
this issue when he states:
Besides counsel's presence at the lineup being necessary to protect
the defendant's specific constitutional rights to confrontation and
the assistance of counsel at the trial itself, the assistance of counsel at the lineup is also necessary to protect the defendant's in-custody assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, for contrary to the Court, I believe that
counsel may advise the defendant not to participate in the lineup
or to participate only under certain conditions.2
A serious question arises as to how an attorney will effectively inform the jury of suggestive improprieties that were employed by the police at the lineup. Frequently, the best witness
on this issue will be the defense counsel himself. Thus, attorneys
may now be required to become key defense witnesses. And it
is not mere academic speculation to question the propriety of the
dual role of attorney and witness which Wade thus implicitly
thrusts upon the defense counsel. Moreover, how much weight
will an attorney's testimony be given by the jury in light of his
vulnerability to impeachment for bias.
If the attorney does not himself take the stand, will it be
advisable to permit the accused to testify as to any pre-trial
impropriety? The jury's response to the defendant's own testimony that the police, either intentionally or unintentionally, were
26 This pre-lineup identification practice was used extensively in the
case of one Bertram Campbell, an excellent example of mistaken identity,
where the defendant spent three years in a New York prison for a crime
of which he was subsequently proven not to be guilty. Campbell v. State,
186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1946).

27 For a complete discussion of the police technique of not permitting the
accused to know when he is being identified viz. two-way mirrors, peepholes, etc., see G. Williams & H. Hammelman, Identification Parades (Aug. 1963) CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 533.
28 Wade at 246.

II,
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guilty of unfair transgressions will be skeptical at best. The
Wade Court recognized the limited value of a defendant's protestations as a witness, and noted the dangers inherent in his
very appearance as a witness:
Even when he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal record he
may be reluctant to take the stand and open up the admission of
prior convictions. Moreover, any protestations by the suspect
of the fairness of the lineup made at trial are likely to be in vain.
29

The preceding discussion suggests strongly the inadequacy
of the Court's position. Further, it is submitted that even if
counsel's awareness of the pre-trial improprieties would "equip
him to attack" the evidence of identification by crossexamination of the witness, it is questionable how successful his attack
would be in light of the great influence identification evidence
has on a jury. Numerous authorities and cases point out the
fact that juries are unduly receptive to such evidence. Wilder
and Wentworth have stated that evidence of identification, however untrustworthy, for whatever reasons, is "taken by the
average juryman as absolute proof. ' 30 Thus, the problem created
by the inherent weaknesses in eyewitness identification is compounded by the fact that juries are unduly receptive to such evidence.
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that if counsel for
defendant is able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the pre-trial confrontation was suggestive, the subsequent courtroom identification should be prohibited. At the very least such
a showing of the suggestive nature of the pre-trial confrontation
should shift the burden to the prosecution to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the courtroom identification had an
origin independent of the improper lineup.
The Court, in attempting to protect the rights of the accused
in the event the right to counsel is denied at the pre-trial confrontation, held that under such circumstances the prosecution
must establish, by clear and convincing proof, that the in-court
identification had an independent origin - a source other than
the improper lineup. Absent such a showing, the courtroom
identification will be prohibited. Justices White, Harlan and
Stewart, in their partly concurring, and partly dissenting opinion, noted:
The Court's opinion is far reaching. It proceeds first by creating
29 Id.
30 H.

at 231.
WILDER & B. WENTWORTH, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION 29 (1918).

E.g., in a Florida prosecution for rape, Spries v. State, 50 Fla. 121, 39 So. 181
(1905), the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death almost exclusively upon the victim's identification testimony. The crime had occurred
in an unlit bedroom on a dark night. The victim testified that the rapist
had fired a gun, thus creating enough light to enable her to see his features
well enough to make an accurate identification. The conviction was affirmed.

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

a new per se rule of constitutional law: a criminal suspect cannot
be subjected to a pretrial identification process in the absence of
his counsel without violating the Sixth Amendment. If he is, the
State may not buttress a later courtroom identification of the witness by any reference to the previous identification. Furthermore,
the courtroom identification is not admissible at all unless the
State can establish by clear and convincing proof that the testimony is not the fruit of the earlier identification made in the absence of defendant's counsel - admittedly a heavy burden for the
State and probably an impossible one. 3 1
The independent origin test laid down by the Court also
raises serious problems of application at the trial court level.

The Court, though it offers variables that can be applied in the
identification area, never defines precisely what will qualify as
an independent recollection. It is doubtful that witnesses can
ever really know, to any degree of certainty, whether the lineup
affected their present in-court identification.
It is not clear
whether trial courts are to apply to their full extent the preexisting rules of the "taint-fruit" doctrine. Justice Black raises

these same questions and others:
The 'tainted fruit' determination required by the Court involves
more than considerable difficulty. I think it is practically impossible.
How is a witness capable of probing the recesses of his mind to
draw a sharp line between a courtroom identification due exclusively to an earlier lineup and a courtroom identification due to
memory not based on the lineup? What kind of 'clear and convincing evidence' can the prosecution offer to provle upon what particular events memories resulting in an in-court identificationrest?
How long will trials be delayed while judges turn psychologists to
probe the subconscious minds of witnesses ?32

As to the problem of what will satisfy the independent
origin test, the majority opinion suggests these guidelines:
Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy
between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person,
the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup,
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse
of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is
also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of
counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup. 3 .

Despite the Court's broad outline of the relevant considerations, the actual method of applying the independent origin test
remains unclear. This confusion is exemplified by lower court
decisions prior to Wade applying the pre-Wade "taint-fruit"
31 Wade at 250. Justice Fortas, in a note to his dissenting opinion, also
relates that mere presence of counsel at pre-trial confrontations *will not
alleviate the inherent weaknesses of eyewitness identifications:
While it is conceivable that legislation might provide a meticulous
lineup procedure which would satisfy constitutional requirements, I do
not agree with the Court that this would 'remove the basis for regarding
the [lineup] stage as critical.' Wade at 262.
32 Wade at 248 (emphasis added).
33 Id.at 241.
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doctrine to related identification areas. On the whole, courts
have been quite liberal in finding that an in-court identification
had an independent source.
Many courts have found an independent origin, upon a simple statement under oath by the identifying witness that his conclusion was not based upon the pre-trial opportunity to view the
accused. For example, in Jacobson v. United States,3 4 during an
illegal arrest and detention of the defendant, a police officer was
permitted to view the accused and subsequently identified the defendant at the trial. The defendant was convicted solely as -a
result of this officer's identification. On appeal it was held that:
Appellant's contention that Peterson would not have been- able to
make a positive identification of appellant but for the fact that he
viewed appellant on November 10, 1964 [the time of the illegal detention] is purely speculative..

..

Appellant's argument is con-

trary to the sworn testimony of the witness when interrogated
in
the absence of the jury prior to his appearance on the stand.36
In People v. Stoner,36 defense counsel moved to strike the
witness' in-court identification on the ground that it was based
on a prior identification of the accused at a suggestive lineup in
which the defendant was required to wear clothing worn by the
perpetrator of the crime. The court held:
The rights of the accused in a case like the present are adequately
protected when the complaining witness takes the stand in open
court, for examination and cross-examination. .

.

. Although it

may be impossible for a person to forget a significant perception
and to prevent stored remembrances from subconsciously affecting
his later perceptions and decisions ....

it does not follow that...

a person in [witness] Greeley's position should be excluded. Even
if Greeley's courtroom identification was dependent in part on his
viewing defendant in illegally obtained clothing at the showup, it
was 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'3 7

In Warren V. Territory of Hawaii,38 counsel for the defendant
moved to strike the in-court identification of an illegally seized
electrocuting device which caused the death of a police officer because such was previously identified by the citizens called by the
state. The court stated: "[E]ach citizen testified at the trial concerning the electrocuting device that her testimony was based on
her independent recollection of its installation and was not based
'3 9
'
on what she saw at the police station.

Therefore, the possibility that courts will hold that the independent origin test will be satisfied by the witness merely stat356 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1966).

3

5Id. at 688.

Cal. Rptr. 897, 422 P.2d 585 (1967).
at 901, 422 P.2d at 589.
38 119 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941).
369Id. at 938. See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Payne v. United
States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49
3655

3V Id.

(D.C. Cir. 1956).
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ing under oath that his recollection is based on a source other
than the lineup not attended by counsel, may destroy the value of
the Wade Court's constitutional dictate that counsel is required
at such critical stage in the prosecution, or in the absence of
such, that it is incumbent upon the state to prove by "clear and
convincing" proof that the in-court identification had an origin
independent of the improper lineup.
In light of the fact that eyewitness identification is inherently weak, that pre-trial confrontations are often riddled with
'intentional and unintentional suggestion, and that the Wade solution. raises more problems than it solves, it is submitted that a
more reasonable and workable solution to the problem is this bipartite conclusion: (a) if no counsel is present at the pre-trial
confrontation the eyewitness identification should be excluded
absolutely, prohibiting any in-court identifications by the witness who -attended the lineup; and (b) even with counsel present, if it is established-by'clear and convincing proof that the
confrontation was suggestive, the courtroom identification should
be excluded without regard to any independent origin consideration.
Application of the foregoing standard will lead to only one
end - a fair and impartial pre-trial confrontation.
Leonard Frank Amari

